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Abstract 
Commercial software is traditionally governed by proprietary licenses that allow usage 
in exchange for a fee. Since the 90’s, more and more commercial software publishers have 
switched to open source and hybrid licenses Open source licenses allow users to freely 
download, copy, modify and distribute software whereas hybrid licenses place certain 
restrictions on freedom. Using Teece’s concept of regime of appropriability (Teece, 1986), 
we highlight the strategic role of software licenses in both open and open source strategies, 
as well as the business models allowing open source software publishers to capture value in 
order to make some profits. 
Keywords: Open Source, software, regime of appropriability, open strategies, business 
models. 
Introduction 
Commercial software was traditionally governed by proprietary licenses that permitted 
their use, often with limits in place, in exchange for a fee. While this once dominant licensing 
pattern is still used today, in the 90’s, commercial software publishers began to “open up” 
their licenses. Free/Open Source licenses (Dalle and Jullien, 2003) provide users many 
rights such as free use, copy, modification, and distribution of software whose source code is 
available (Perens, 1999; Rosenberg, 2000). Other licences that we will call “hybrid licenses” 
have more in common with open licenses, but they resemble proprietary licenses in that they 
provide only some of the rights given by strict free/open source licenses (e.g. use and copy 
for example, whereas modification and distribution are subject to conditions).  
Open strategies have been a subject of interest for management researchers for 
some time. They first appeared in the 70’s--network industries and especially the computer 
industry embraced this new principle. However, they go against traditional behaviour that 
sought to closely guard intellectual property rights (IPR) of technology. This was done in 
order to maximum profit by licensing this technology to other actors in exchange for royalties. 
Open strategies make available the technology to many actors in order to penetrate markets 
subject to uncertain technological competition (Bresnahan and Greenstein, 1999; Shapiro 
and Varian, 1999). If the license of technology is widely acknowledged as a strategic tool 
used to maximize profits and to control the technology and the market (Tayler and Silberston, 
1973; Gallini, 1984; Katz and Shapiro, 1986; Bessy and Brousseau, 1998; Aroraa, 2003; 
Lichtenthaler, 2007), there are few articles related to the strategic role of software licenses.  
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 By examining the extant case studies and literature on open source strategies, I make 
a contribution to the practioners by pointing out the strategic role of software licenses. 
Furthermore, this paper identifies important issues that are as yet unadressed in the 
literature thereby making an important contribution. In this article, through the use of Teece’s 
concept of regime of appropriability (Teece, 1986), I aim at highlighting the strategic role of 
software licenses in both open and open source strategies. These two strategies are 
generally set up with an aim of diffusion or co-operation of a voluntary community that 
develops the product in order to reach a standard. If they seem to be comparable, they 
however subject the software publisher to two different regimes of appropriability. A regime 
of appropriability refers to environmental factors excluding firm and market that govern 
innovator’s ability to capture the profits generated by an innovation. It highlights the way 
revenues are shared between the innovator and third parties. According to Teece (1986) the 
regime of appropriability reflects the more or less easily imitable character of a technology It 
is determined by the conjunction of strong or weak regimes of legal protection and the nature 
of technology which is easier to imitate as it is codified. Software publisher that undertake a 
simple open strategy benefit from a weak regime of appropriability; it allows them to keep a 
share of control on their technology though. Software publishers who choose an open source 
strategy set up the weakest regime of appropriability that we call regime of non-
appropriability: it does not allow the software publisher to keep a share of control on its 
product and consequently it also limits its opportunities to capture value.  
Finally, in simple open strategies, the license constitutes a very powerful strategic 
tool. Software publishers can shape and use this tool to reach objectives of diffusion, and co-
operation (Von Hippel, 2002; Von Hippel and Von Krogh, 2003), while making sure of a 
share of control and consequently of value capture. In addition, in open source strategies, 
which one can regard as a subset of open strategies, the regime of non-appropriability is set 
up thanks to very strict criteria concerning the acceptable clauses in the license. So the room 
for manoeuvre concerning the choice of the clauses of the license is limited: if co-operation 
and diffusion are incontestably favoured, the software publisher faces problems of random 
value capture. For open source software publishers, software licenses thus constitute a 
strategic tool of lower range that they must supplement by the installation of an effective 
business model. It is thus the search for this business model which constitutes the principal 
stake for them. Besides, we will see that the software industry is in a phase of search and 
emergence of business models (Raymond, 1999; Valimaki, 2003; Dahlander, 2005) likely to 
allow the cohabitation of the requirements of profit necessary to belong to the commercial 
sphere with a regime of non-appropriability essential to the survival of Open Source.  
In the first part, I present the stakes of open strategies in terms of diffusion and co-
operation by showing how the choice of clauses in licenses can be carried out in order to 
reach these two objectives, while guaranteeing value capture. In the second part, I focus on 
Open Source and show first of all that open source licenses constitute an institution which 
has emerged spontaneously with an aim of countering the will of firms to appropriate the 
work developed in a collaborative way. Then, I discuss open source strategies that can be 
regarded as a subset of open strategies, distinguished by room for weaker strategic 
manoeuvre. The third part is devoted to highlight the fact that we are facing a process of 
emergence of business models: the conditions making it possible to reconcile the regime of 
non-appropriability essential to the survival of Open Source and sources of value capture 
also essential to the survival of Open Source in the commercial sphere. 
Software licenses: a strategic tool for open strategies 
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If the strategic concerns of software s are so important, it is because of the 
characteristics of this type of product. Indeed, the software belongs to the category of 
numerical goods [HORN, 2000], characterized by:  
- Very high fixed costs of development, but a variable cost of reproduction close to 
zero. Thus, the major part of expenditure related to the production of software is R & D 
investments necessary to develop the program. For this reason, the co-operation of a 
community of voluntary developers is welcomed by software publishers. 
- The existence of strong increasing returns of adoption (Arthur, 1988), whose 
network externalities (Katz and Shapiro, 1992) constitute the principal source. This 
characteristic creates a phenomenon of feedback effect, which is a consequence of the 
desire of purchasers to belong to the broadest network, in order to benefit from network 
externalities and to acquire the technology which will end up remaining on the market 
(Arthur, 1996).  
- An important possibility of lock-in of users. In the software industry, the lock-in of 
users in situations where the costs of change are so important that they oblige them to keep 
adopted technologies without being able to change is particularly frequent (Shapiro and 
Varian, 1999). 
These characteristics favour the establishment of de facto standards, guaranteeing 
the company having succeeded in establishing them a dominant market position. One then 
understands better the strategies of software publishers; aimed at imposing their 
technologies through mass diffusion and to support the co-operation of a community of 
developers. We will see how open strategies can make it possible to reach these two types 
of objectives, and how licenses become means to that end. 
Open strategy issues 
While studying the exploitation of feedback effects two generic strategies in a 
technological context of competition are apparent (Shapiro and Varian, 1999):  
- On one hand, we have strategies of control. They result in a control of the evolution 
of the technologies (like their improvement, the rhythm of provision of higher versions, as can 
be seen in Microsoft’s MS Office) or that of their diffusion. The company remains the only 
one able to deliver licenses for use and limits their compatibility with concurrent technologies 
(by preventing the access to the source code or by introducing voluntarily incompatibilities 
with the competitor systems). Once the technology adopted as a “de facto” standard, the 
competitive position of the company is reinforced. However, the effectiveness of this 
strategy, concerning the exploitation of the feedback effect is limited, because prospective 
customers are hesitant of a possible lock in situation. This type of strategy corresponds more 
to an aim of effective exploitation of dominant position than to that of imposition of standards 
in a context of technological competition. 
- On the other hand there are open strategies. They entail the abandonment of 
technological control in order to set up conditions more favourable to their adoption by users 
and to the co-operation of some of them to their development and improvement. The 
company then decides to place its technology at the disposal of all, so that compatible 
products can be manufactured. For a software publisher, this type of strategy consists in 
providing the source code of its product. This strategy counts on the positive effects of an 
absence of lock-in for users, intended to make the product quickly adopted, and to initiate co-
operation and feedback. However, the company does not really have a competitive 
advantage on its competitors anymore, because they risk other manufacturer’s developing 
compatible products. It is when the results of a battle of standards seem dubious, that an 
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open product remains one of the only chances for the company to start a feedback effect and 
to impose its standard, even if the loss of control of technology can constitute a handicap 
thereafter. 
In a context of a technological battle, adopting an open strategy can make it possible 
for a company to impose its technology as a de facto standard. In the rest of this article, we 
study the role of the software licenses in this type of strategy, while trying to show that far 
from being alleviating, software publishers regard them as powerful strategic tools at their 
service. 
Major issue of open strategies: finding the most suitable level of control 
For reasons of diffusion of technology and installation of a co-operation with 
sophisticated users, companies can choose to set up open strategies. If these companies 
wish to draw advantage from the accession to the statute of standard of the technologies 
they sponsor, they must however maintain a certain degree of control on these technologies. 
Indeed, a pure open strategy would eliminate each company’s historic source of 
differentiation; i.e. the competitive advantage supplied by control of a proprietary technology 
(West, 2003). It is one of the lessons which Garud and Kumaraswamy (1993) also draw from 
their study of open systems developed by Sun Microsystems: the strategies of control make 
it possible to set up entry barriers intended to give the sponsor a competitive advantage. In 
open strategies like that adopted by Sun Microsystems, in spite of an opening favourable to 
the diffusion of its products, the company can however preserve the “privileges” inherent to 
its position that enable it “to enjoy transient monopoly positions during which it can design 
and implement future elements of its technical system before its rivals” (Garud and 
Kumaraswamy, 1993, p.360).  
It seems obvious that a company wishing to benefit from an open strategy must 
maintain privileges, that is to say a share of control on the technology. However, it is more 
difficult to determine which degree of control the company must keep on its technology, and 
this question is crucial, as expresses by the title of West’s (2003) article : “How Open is Open 
Enough?”. Indeed, control and opening have opposite effects, as the first limits the process 
of adoption, and the second accelerates it. As a consequence, the wrong balance between 
them can foil the imposition of the sponsor’s technology. Morris and Ferguson (1993) 
analyze three cases of failure and success through this consideration. They judge that the 
failure of IBM on the PC market and its loss of control are due to the fact that the company 
opened too much its technology, without keeping the control of one of the essential 
components, i.e. the operating system and the microprocessor. As regards APPLE and its 
failure in the imposition of Mac on the micro-computers market, the excess is opposite, 
because the company did not open its architecture enough for the diffusion effect to be 
positive. On the other hand, according to them, Sun Microsystems had a successful open 
strategy with regard to its workstations, consisting of licensing their SPARC RISC 
processor’s architecture to software developers and manufacturers, enabling them to 
produce clones. 
Finally, West concludes that the use of “hybrid strategies”, namely mixing at the same 
time opening and control suggests that proprietary vendors are aware of the competitive 
risks of such an appropriability waiver and are thus experimenting to find the right 
compromise between totally proprietary platforms (which would be rejected by the market) 
and totally open ones (which would eliminate all competitive advantage) (West, 2003, 
p.1279).  
License as a tool for open strategies allowing the set up of a more or less weak regime 
of appropriability. 
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In open strategies, the role of the license proves to be central. It is used through its 
clauses for encouraging technology adoption. However, the license must also be selected in 
order to maintain the opportunity thereafter of controlling enough technology so that the 
sponsor can earn income at a later point in time. The ambiguity of the set up of the strategy 
turns around the “institutional entrepreneurship” of Garud and al. (2002). Indeed, the 
institutional entrepreneur must provide enough incentives to ensure the support of a 
maximum number of actors in order to impose standards. At the same time, it is necessary to 
create rules that are in their favour and that allow them to control technology immediately or 
later on. The challenge therefore is to strike a balance where the institutional entrepreneur 
chooses a license likely to maximize future revenues for the company, while not limiting the 
potential for diffusion and adoption.  
So, the software publisher’s choice of license can be influenced by a strategic desire 
for co-operation and diffusion on the one hand and by the need to control and capture value 
on the other. Open strategies thus often consist of a balance made by the institutional 
entrepreneur between those strategic components. Software licenses constitute the 
instrument of its set up, because it is an assembly of specific clauses representing the 
different strategic components. It is then possible to decode the overall strategy of a 
company by analyzing the various clauses of its product licenses and highlighting the 
elements of diffusion and control. This observation leads to a methodology of strategic 
analysis of licenses, which principle is to associate each clause of a license to one or more of 
the strategic components it serves. (See Figure 1). 
Figure 1 : From Strategy to License 
 Stratégy 1 Stratégy 2 Stratégy 4 
2nd Strategic Component 
3rd Strategic Component  
1st Strategic Component  
Stratégy 
License 
Clause 1 
Clause 2 
Clause 3
Stratégy 3
4th Strategic Component  
 
 
Let us apply this methodology to the Java example from Sun Microsystems in order to 
highlight the characteristics of its open strategy which enabled Java to keep a certain share 
of control over its technology.  
To simplify, we will symbolize the four strategic components thereafter in the following way:  
S1 for co-operation with a community of contributors, 
S2 for diffusion, 
S3 for control, 
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S4 for value capture 
 
The SCSL (Sun Community License Source) was created by Sun Microsystems for 
Jini; their Java protocol of communication between peripherals and then applied to several 
other Java products. Sun Microsystems communicates on the open character of the SCSL 
(Garud and Kumaraswamy, 1993). However, if use and copy are free distribution is not. On 
one hand, distribution of derived products by third parties remain free as long as it is made 
for free, but it is not free anymore as soon as one user wishes to earn revenue from this 
activity. In this case, Sun Microsystems imposes the payment of fees and royalties and 
grants a capacity of certification of derived products. In addition, if the corrections of errors 
must be placed under license SCSL to be given to the community, modifications of other 
kinds (as improvements) can become Sun’s ownership.  
The translation of this license in strategic terms gives the following result: 
 
¾Free use   Î S2 
¾Free modification  Î S2 + S1 
S1 = Cooperation 
S2 = Diffusion 
S3 = Control 
S4 = Value capture 
¾Free distribution if free  Î S2 
¾Fee + Royalties  Î S4 
¾Certification   Î S3 
¾Modifications can be used  Î S1 + S3 
 
The SCSL supports the component S2 of diffusion through the clauses of free use, 
free modification and free distribution if free. Indeed, at the beginning of the 90’s, during the 
launching of Java, the availability of source code as well as free use, modification and 
distribution provided strong incentives for adoption in a market where almost all software 
were of the traditional proprietary type. The component S1 of co-operation is also 
represented by the clause of free modification which creates a logic of co-operation of Java 
users, making it possible to enrich the tools  constantly.  
The maintenance of shared control in this open strategy also appears when studying 
the clauses of this license. By the clause of certification, Sun Microsystems sets up S3, the 
control component by requiring every derived product intended for sale be approved and 
certified by Java.In this way, Sun keeps evolutionary control of their products as well as how 
competitors use their technology. This allows Sun to eliminate projects which go against their 
strategy or to refuse Java licensing to threatening rivals. In the same way, the clause 
allowing Sun to adapt modifications by the development community in any product, whatever 
its license, permits them to keep a share of control by improving not only the SCSL products 
but also their other products (including proprietary ones). Lastly, the S4 component, value 
capture, is introduced thanks to the preservation of control allowing discrimination between 
commercial and noncommercial users. For the first, redistribution is not free, but subjected to 
the payment of a fee  and the license also imposes a clause of “grant-back”.  
The example of Sun Microsystems is one where a company attempts to, through the 
SCSL (Sun Community Source License), benefit from the best off both worlds (Gabriel and 
 
6
Joy, 1998). Namely they tap into the advantages of the proprietary world (characterized by 
control strategies) and those of the open source world (characterized by a very high degree 
of opening) by combining enticing adoption clauses with supporting control clausesi. Among 
the clauses intended for diffusion one can quote free use and free distribution, which attract 
the maximum number of individuals through a beneficial exemption from payment favourable 
to diffusion; one can also cite free modification, which is a signal of quality, compatibility and 
adaptability. However, some clauses allow Sun Microsystems to keep a certain degree of 
control. Among these clauses, one finds the option available to Sun of incremental 
improvements and corrections developed by thirds. In other words, it gives to Sun the right to 
change the license of the product, even if this product benefited from external co-operations: 
this clause goes against a signal of credible commitment about the perpetuity of Sun’s open 
strategy. The clauses of grant-back and certification of derived product respectively allow a 
control over competitors and technology. Of course, these two types of clauses have 
opposite effects. That is why it is necessary to strike the right balance between the effect 
produced by each of them, and to ensure they do not prevent technology from realizing 
successful diffusion and market leadership. In the case of Sun Microsystems, this strategy 
was successful—far from deterring users, the license allowed such a diffusion that Java 
became the de facto standard. 
This case shows more than the strategic importance of licensing choices by software 
publishers wishing to set up an open strategy. It highlights the fact that licenses become 
strategic tools, insofar as the choice of its clauses endables conditions of openness while 
preserving a part of control. This makes it possible for the software publisher to profit from a 
competitive advantage acquired thanks to open strategies and capture value. Moreover, the 
choice of license helps set up a more or less weak regime of appropriability (Teece, 1986). 
One can consider that a weak regime of appropriability makes technology easily imitable, 
whereas a strong regime of appropriability provides protection against imitations. Yet the 
weakness or the force of these regimes of appropriability has an impact on the success of a 
technology. According to Teece (1986), the most important dimensions of such a regime are 
the nature of technology and the legal mechanisms of protection, such as the patents, 
copyrights and trade secrets. Yet, in this analysis, the regime of appropriability remains 
exogenous, since it is determined by the nature of technology as well as by the regime of 
legal protection (patent or copyright for example). Indeed, it remains inherent to elements on 
which the company has little room for manoeuvre. The regime of protection is legally given, 
and the nature of technology not easily modifiable. Now, in reality, the company given the 
strategy it chooses (control or opening), can modulate this regime of appropriability, by 
making it weaker than the maximum one, conferred by the intellectual property right 
protecting its technology. Thus, the provision of an architecture’s specifications or less strict 
conditions of license afford competitors access to their technology and to the ability to imitate 
it. This amounts to reducing the force of the regime of appropriability conferred by the nature 
of the technology and its legal regime of intellectual protection. This way, one can say that 
the degree of the regime of appropriability is not fixed and exogenous, but depends on the 
strategy chosen by the sponsor, and the license constitutes the instrument allowing the 
company to determine it.  
The specificity of Open source strategies: a regime of non-appropriability where the 
role of license as a strategic tool weakens 
Even if many authors may assimilate open strategies and open source strategies 
(West, 2003), they are different. Open source strategies get specificities that give rise to a 
regime of non-appropriability and consequently weaken the role of the license as a strategic 
tool. These specificities are related to the story of the emergence of open source licenses 
and the will to avoid appropriation of software. 
The emergence of GPL as an institution in reaction to the phenomena of appropriation 
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To understand the emergence of the open source phenomenon, it is necessary to 
place it in an historical context. Indeed, as long as the computer industry consisted of 
incompatible systems specific to each producer of hardware, software has not represented a 
critical resource likely to give place to a strict intellectual protection policy. The public sphere, 
mainly made up of researchers, could then freely use, modify and diffuse between its 
members these software and be devoted to their co-operative development. Nevertheless, in 
the 80’s, the passage to an environment based on compatible technical systems made 
software become a crucial resource and a commercial product. Fittingly, managing the IPR 
on these products becomes stricter and the commercial and proprietary logic did not allow 
the public sphere model of development to remain. Indeed, software developed according to 
this public sphere model required the application of very weak protection to these products in 
order to encourage contributions, diffusion and finally innovation. However, confronted with a 
commercial sphere that imposed strict protection, these products, given their small degree of 
protection, could not resist being appropriated by the actors in the commercial sphere. So, 
they ended up slipping into this commercial sphere, thus cutting the logic of incremental 
innovation, as was the case for Unix. It is the search for solutions making it possible to 
answer this disadvantage which will lead to the emergence of particular institutions and to 
the birth of the Free Movement. 
In 1984, Richard Stallman, a researcher at MIT, attends to the decline of the 
university tradition of sharing and opening of code, supplanted by closed systems and 
proprietary software. Facing these phenomena, it aims at finding a means of perpetuating the 
university tradition, and creates the Free Movement. The major institution underlying this 
movement, born from the collaboration of Stallman and Eben Möglen, a law professor 
convinced by the Free philosophy, consists of the concept of copyleft and GPL (General 
Public License). The principle of this license answers the problem of appropriation that 
programs free of rights face. Indeed, until the creation of the GPL, the sharing of source 
codes implied software free of rights, i.e. on which authors did not assert any copyright. 
However, such programs free of rights gave to anybody the ability to adopt this software and 
incorporate it into their own closed versions. The development of the concept of copyleft 
offers then, for open software, an alternative to the free of rights software, making it possible 
to prevent programs developed in a collaborative way to be freely adopted by commercial 
companies.  
Thus, the copyleft and the GPL is based on the IPR institution, and more particularly 
copyright. It consists in coupling the copyright held by an author to the program with a license 
whose terms authorize use, copy, modification and diffusion of the software. It also imposes 
obligations such as accompanying any distribution with the source code and placing any 
derived software under the same GPL license in order to guarantee the open character and 
the absence of appropriation of the software. Without this pledge of perpetual availability of 
source code, represented by the copyleft, the cohabitation of free and proprietary models 
would not have been possible because the second would have absorbed the innovations of 
the first, preventing the free software model from developing. To summarize, one can say 
that the action of Richard Stallman, led to the emergence of two types of institutions: an 
institutionalized community known by all, with common rules and values, supporting a 
regime of co-operative development inherited from the public tradition, and a new form of 
license intended to ensure the perpetuity of this mode of development vis-a-vis a 
commercial world founded on the appropriation. The ambition of Richard Stallman only 
consisted in creating a framework making it possible to make this regime of co-operative 
development between public laboratories and commercial sphere possible without one 
destroying the other by systematically appropriating the innovations which result from it.  
Finally, copyleft constitutes an institution which makes it possible to set up a quite 
particular regime of appropriability, so weak that we can describe it as regime of non-
appropriability. Indeed, software are completely imitable since they can be copied, modified 
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and distributed freely, but also completely non-appropriable, since any source code under 
GPL (or another license free) must remain under free license, which prevents any company 
from appropriating free software by closing the source code which must remain open. This 
regime of non-appropriability is not a problem in Richard Stallman’s first vision of the Free 
mode of development, i.e. reserved for the public and non-commercial sphere, since it fulfils 
its role: to prevent companies from appropriating software. However, it will raise important 
strategic stakes since it will be inevitable and essential for their survival that free software be 
integrated in the commercial sphere. 
From Free to Open Source: a step towards the commercial sphere 
The emergence of the two institutions we highlighted contributed to create a 
successful mode of co-operative development that led to the design of high-quality free 
software. It then makes sense that Free can also find its place in the commercial sphere. 
Indeed, we face a successful development mode based on institutionalized communities, 
which makes software developed this way reach a relatively high degree of quality that 
seems to be comparable, in certain cases, with that of software developed by traditional 
commercial companies. In addition, free licenses, based on IPR institutions as traditional 
proprietary licenses, make it possible to organize a market of free software. Consequently, 
we cannot consider any more that software industry is divided into two spheres: a non-
commercial one producing free software and a commercial one, dedicated to proprietary 
software. We rather can say that free and proprietary software belong to the same 
commercial sphere organized by licenses that can take different forms. Moreover, this mode 
of co-operative development quickly tends to exceed the limits of the public sphere, as well 
as those of the not-commercial sphere. As a proof, many firms built their commercial activity 
around Linux (with for example commercial Linux distributions like RedHat, Mandrake or 
Suse, or Linux compatible hardware and systems provided by IBM). 
However, for Richard Stallman, the creation of copyleft only aimed at perpetuating an 
alternative mode of production, different from the proprietary one. Consequently, the Libre 
movement excluded free software development from the commercial sphere, because of too 
strict principles. Consequently, whereas Linux gained great success in the research world, it 
realized limited success in the commercial sphere, which may hurt its long term development 
potentialii. Under these conditions, a new movement, the Open Source, emerged in 1998, 
whose principal objective consisted in creating a movement intended to develop Linux and to 
set up favourable conditions to a commercial activity around free software, like licenses 
respecting the principle of copyleft, but better adapted to a commercial activity (Perens 
1999). The Open Source Initiative (OSI) was created soon after: in order to manage the 
Open Source movement and to draw up a list of licenses filling the open source criteria. In 
reality, if one can agree to saying that the Free software principles remain stricter than those 
of the OSI, the list of “free” licenses is identical, with some exceptions, to that of OSI certified 
licenses.  
If the regime of non-appropriability set up by copyleft does not pose problems in the 
public sphere, provided the non-commercial character of activity, it raises important problems 
in the commercial sphere, where software publishers must draw an income from their activity 
of development. 
Now let us reiterate the reasoning discussed in the first part: we said that the regime 
of appropriability was drawn up by the software publisher through the choice of the clauses in 
the license, to preserve a degree of control and to proportion it in order not to block the 
diffusion of software. Thus, a license conferring on the software publisher a very strong 
degree of control founds a regime of appropriability characteristic of proprietary strategies. A 
license conferring a smaller degree of control on him founds an also weaker regime of 
appropriability characteristic of open strategies. The weaker the regime of appropriability, the 
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smaller the degree of control is, and the wider the opening will be. If an open source license 
is chosen, the regime of appropriability set up by clauses subjected to precise criteria, thus 
becomes a regime of non-appropriability, which implies an absence of control for the sponsor 
who chooses to adhere to this model.  
This situation has major consequences in strategic terms. Indeed, we saw that the 
success of an open strategy depends on the sponsor qualities of the institutional 
entrepreneur, i.e. its ability to keep a share of control without blocking the diffusion of the 
technology. However, free software publisher choose open source licenses which deprives 
them of this share of control and limits their institutional entrepreneurship. That leads us to 
say that open source strategies are not strictly comparable to open strategies, but constitute 
a subset of them.  
Specificities of the open source strategies, compared to the open strategies 
We saw that licenses are the central element of implementation of software 
publisher’s strategies, since they translate the degree of control they wish to keep on their 
software. Nevertheless, the open source community, via the OSI, drew up a list of open 
source licenses, i.e. whose clauses satisfy particular criteria. For example, the GPL or LGPL 
clauses satisfy these criteria, whereas those of the SCSL used by Sun for Jini do not. By the 
establishment of these criteria, the OSI thus limits the software publisher’s ability to shape 
the license in order to decide a strategic degree of control. Through the clauses of licenses 
respecting the OSI criteria, it settles a regime of non-appropriability, which guarantees the 
durability of opening. Open strategies miss this perennial aspect, because the sponsor does 
not undergo any restriction concerning the clauses of his license and he is free to set up the 
regime of appropriability he likes, whatever its strength.  
In an open strategy, the sponsor thus has the possibility of modulating the strength of 
the regime of appropriability, whereas in an open source strategy, this regime is settled at its 
lowest level. That is why open source strategies constitute a subset of open strategies. The 
open source licenses have the ability, provided the criteria they fulfil, to impose a 
regime of weak appropriability, and thus to limit the degree of possible control. 
Consequently, the institutional entrepreneur room for manoeuvre is also limited, 
which makes it possible to better guarantee the perpetual aspect of the absence of 
users lock-in.  
When West (2003) identifies two ways of keeping a share of control on software while 
managing an open source strategy, respectively (1) Partly Open and (2) Openly Parts, it 
presents actually two types of open strategies. The first one cannot be assimilated to an 
open source strategy, because it uses the license as a strategic tool in order to modulate the 
strength of the regime of appropriability. The other one can be regarded as an open source 
strategy, because it plays on another lever to control a platform. 
(1) The Partly Open strategy consists in disclosing technology under such restrictions 
that it provides value to customers while making it difficult for it to be directly employed by 
competitors (West, 2003, p.1279). The sponsor who holds an IPR on a standard deploys an 
open strategy by granting licenses for the whole platform, but arranges things so that these 
licenses give to the users only limited rights and reinforces the sponsor’s ones. That amounts 
of course to a regime of weak appropriability, but not to a regime of non-appropriability: it 
thus cannot be assimilated to an open source strategy. This type of strategy is that applied 
by Sun Microsystems for Java: the company indeed undertook a policy of massive license for 
its technology, in order to encourage its fast adoption; however, the license contains 
restrictive clauses, incompatible with the open source criteria, making it possible for Sun 
Microsystems to keep control on its technology.  
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 (2) The Openly Parts strategy consists in waving control of commodity layer(s) of the 
platform, while retaining full control of other layers that presumably provide greater 
opportunities for differentiation (West, 2003, p.1279). Software platforms are systems made 
up of various modules. It is thus technically possible not to open the whole system, but to 
limit this opening to some modules, or to the interfaces, i.e the rules allowing the modules to 
interact between each other. So, in an integrated system composed of various modules, it is 
not necessary to control the whole system, but only one or more critical components, to 
control a standard. For example the PC, whose IBM decided to open the architecture in 
1981, is a system made up of various modules like the hardware, the microprocessor and the 
operating system. However, IBM, opened its architecture, and left INTEL and Microsoft (two 
small companies at this time) to design (and thus control) respectively the microprocessor 
and operating system. The giant of computer industry had then not identified these two 
components as key components of the PC architecture, and consequently lost the control of 
it in favour of INTEL and Microsoft.  
The Openly Parts strategy thus rests on the settlement of a regime of non-
appropriability for certain modules, whereas a strong regime of appropriability is set up for 
other modules, in order to keep the control of the system. Usually, the low layers on which 
applications are built benefit from an open source strategy, with standardization in mind, 
whereas the proprietary strategy (i.e. control strategy) relates rather to the applicative layers.  
In conclusion, the Partly Open strategy can be assimilated rather to a traditional open 
strategy, because of persistence of a part of control; however, it cannot belong to the 
category of open source strategies because the licenses used do not set up a regime of non-
appropriability as they cannot be included in the OSI certified open source list. Alternatively, 
the Openly Parts strategy can be regarded as the combination of an open source strategy if 
the license used is compatible with the OSI criteria and a strategy of control. (See table 1). 
Table 1: Summary table of the various open strategies. 
 
Openly Parts 
 
  
Opening without control 
Module 1 Module 2 
 
Partly Open  
Control clauses    X X 
Opening clauses  X X  X 
 
 
 
Open source strategies 
 
The open source strategies then represent a particular category of open strategies 
whose purpose is diffusion with an aim of standardization. Indeed, they imply a regime of 
non-appropriability and an absence of control of the software. So, in the open source 
strategies, the room for manoeuvre of the software publisher to define the terms of the 
license is so much limited by the criteria imposed by the OSI, that the license is not used, as 
in the open strategies, as a tool making it possible for the institutional entrepreneur to 
modulate his control and to create sources of value capture. Nevertheless, to impose its 
technology does not constitute the only issue for a firm; it can certainly be a prime issue, but 
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immediately followed by a second one, which consists in “drawing advantage” from this 
position of standard, i.e. generating an income.  
As a consequence, the problems of the open source software publisher in the 
commercial sphere consist in finding a means of generating incomes in spite of the regime of 
non-appropriability set up by the license and thus the impossibility of using licenses as 
strategic tools. That is why we observe the emergence of several more or less effective open 
source business models that are essential to the survival of Open Source in the commercial 
sphere.  
The emergence of business models in order to capture value 
The criteria that open source licenses must respect to fit the OSI definition creates a 
regime of non-appropriability. Thus, they prevents a software publisher subscribing to this 
model to use the license as a strategic tool aiming at keeping a share of control while 
encouraging the diffusion of a technology in order to make it a standard. If control is so 
important, it is because it allows the preservation of a competitive advantage as well as the 
capture of value created through the development of the software.  
In the open strategies, the license and its clauses are used to secure this value 
capture as in the example of Sun Microsystems and the SCSL, which imposes to the 
commercial users the payment of a fee. In the open source strategies, the clauses of the 
licenses prohibit such a direct value capture. This is why the open source software 
publishers are today in a process of search for suitable business models to reconcile this 
mode of value creation and the capture of a part of this value. The first models which have 
emerged are bundle models which entail large risks in terms of value capture; then the 
double-license models, less random but however dedicated to a certain type of software. 
Today are appearing business models founded on mutualisation, more suitable to products 
specific to large companies’ needs.  
The “bundle” models and their risks in terms of value capture 
The first business models under consideration by the open source software 
publishers are based on the principle of “bundle”, i.e. supplying open source software and 
capturing value from a product or dependant service.  
The model of bundle between open source software and service consists in 
providing an open source software and getting revenue from the supply of services related to 
the integration of the software, its adaptation to the needs of firms and its maintenance 
(Muselli, 2004) (See figure 2). 
Figure 2: Model of Bundle between Open Source Software and Services 
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 Open source license 
Strategic goal : 
Diffusion 
Software Edition Engineering and maintenance 
Integration 
Maintenance 
Formation 
… 
Indirect value capture 
1 product 
Users 
(potential customers) 
Customers 
License Source: Laure Muselli  
However, this business model entails strong risks in terms of value capture, as 
Teece’s (1986) analyse predicts. According to him, profits are shared between the innovator, 
its customers and also the imitators and “followers”, as well as suppliers. It shows that the 
establishment of this technology as a standard by the innovator is not sufficient so that she 
can collect the created value. Indeed, the share of profits generated by the innovation is 
mainly influenced by the nature of the regime of appropriability. In addition, complementary 
assets and competences that the innovator does not hold necessarily are necessary to the 
commercial exploitation of the innovation. Teece (1986) describes these complementary 
assets as competences in terms of marketing, production or after-sales services. If the 
innovator does not hold these assets, the value capture depends all the more on the nature 
of the regime of appropriability: 
- If the regime of appropriability is strong and thus copy is not easy, the innovator will 
profit from sufficient time to acquire the missing competences, without a competitor already 
having these competences being able to copy the innovation and thus overtake him by 
profiting from a competitive advantage.  
- In the case of a weak regime of appropriability, even a non-appropriability one, as 
for Open Source, technology is easy to imitate. This confers to the innovator not having the 
needed complementary assets and competences a very weak competitive advantage. On 
the other hand, a possible newcomer mastering these assets and competences benefits from 
a big competitive advantage since he can acquire the technology quite easily. When the 
technology is easy to imitate, competitive outcomes quickly come to be determined by who 
had easiest access to the complementary assets (Teece, 1986, p.292). As a consequence, if 
the open source software publisher does not control strategic resources and competences, 
he is likely not to capture value and make profits. These competences and resources relate 
to the aptitude to integrate the software at the customers and can be the ability to deploy 
teams among various sometimes geographically distant customers, or quite simply the 
control of a network of customers. The computer engineering and maintenance companies, 
whose job consists especially in software integration hold these resources and competences, 
whereas the software publisher has neither necessary human resources, nor customers 
databases and must carry out long and expensive efforts of canvassing. In this case, the 
profit share can occur with the advantage these computer engineering and maintenance 
companies, although the efforts of innovation have been made by the software publisher 
possibly helped by a community of programmers. (See Diagram 2) 
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For the open source software, the regime of non-appropriability settled by the license 
makes the use of the software not anymore directly subjected to any fee, since the license 
allows adopters to use, copy and distribute the program freely. The value capture by the 
software publisher moves then towards the line of the chain and can be carried out only at 
the activities of service, whose generation of profit is not affected by the principle of open 
license, since this activity is directly remunerated. The software publisher thus finds himself 
in direct competition with the computer engineering and maintenance companies.  
The second business model is also a bundle between two products: an open 
source software and a complementary proprietary module (See figure 3).  
Figure 3: Model of Bundle between Open Source Software and Proprietary 
Software 
 
1 market 
 
Users 
Open source license 
 
Strategic goal : 
Diffusion 
Proprietary license 
 
Strategic goal: 
Value capture 
2 complementary 
products 
Product 1 Product 2 
Software edition 
Direct value capture 
License Source: Laure Muselli 
 
One finds here West’s (2003) Openly Parts strategy. This time, the software publisher 
does not confine anymore with a uniform open source strategy, since he uses a proprietary 
license for some components. In doing so it makes it impossible for the software publisher to 
remain “pure-play”, according to Feller and Fitzgerald’s (2002) typology, that is to say to have 
an “all open source” policy as in the open source product/service bundle business model. 
Here, the software publisher belongs to the “hybrid” category.  
This business model is related to the “Buy In – Follow On” strategy (Weygand, 1991), 
based on a systemic vision of products, where a product or service –the Buy In- at a less 
than satisfactory profit or even at a loss., […and] a linked product or service –the Follow On- 
[is sold] at a significant profit. The risk of this strategy lies in the randomness of 
remuneration, provided the entry of free-riders trying to sell the Follow On product, without 
supporting the costs related to the Buy In product. This possibility is all the more probable as 
the regime of appropriability settled around the principal product is weak, and as its 
interfaces are open, allowing a third company to manufacture compatible or dependant 
products too. 
In these two strategies of bundle, there are important risks about value capture, which 
do not guarantee to the software publisher of an open software source a flow of incomes. 
Thus, if the economy of open software source was, during one moment, regarded as limited 
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to an “economy of bundles” (Dalle, 2002), the randomness of value capture led the software 
publishers to seek and imagine more complex business models, guaranteeing their incomes 
better.  
The double license model 
In order to secure value capture in spite of the regime of non-appropriability set up by 
the open source license, a new business model has emerged, that differs from a strategy of 
bundling. 
The principle of this model consists in the fact that the same product is offered to two 
different categories of users under discriminated conditions (See figure 4). This time still, we 
are not in a “pure-play” strategy, but instead in a “hybrid” one. 
Figure 4: Double License Model. 
 
Software editor 
License 1 
Open source 
 
Strategic goal : 
Diffusion 
License 2 
Propriétary 
 
Strategic goal : 
Value capture 
1 
product 
Users developing 
open source 
derived products 
Users developing 
proprietary 
derived products
2 
markets 
Direct value capture 
License  
The company divides its product users in two categories. Discriminated conditions of 
use then will be applied by the company to these two categories of users, and this via two 
licenses, according to the principle of “dual licensing” (Valimaki, 2003). Thus, an open source 
license, generally the GPL, is conceded by the software publisher to certain users, whereas 
others can only profit from a proprietary license. The supply of the source code of the 
software in the derived end use product constitutes the criterion of application of the open 
source license or the proprietary license: if the user sells a product integrating the software, 
but places it under an open source license, he will be allowed to profit from the open source 
license; but if the derived product is proprietary, the subscribed license will be proprietary 
and subjected to the payment of a fee. Thus, the clauses of the license do not discriminate 
the users (this being prohibited by the OSI criteria), but the users exclude themselves from 
the field of non-appropriability of the license as from the moment when they wish to produce 
a derived proprietary software. Here, the license is not a strategic tool, but it is the 
combination of two licenses which makes it possible for the software publisher to create a 
source of value capture, while respecting the regime of non-appropriability imposed by the 
Open Source. 
This model is of double interest. The first one is related to the possibility of combining 
the advantages of a traditional open source strategy, allowing co-operation with a community 
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of programmers and diffusion, and those of a proprietary strategy, which allows a direct 
valorisation through the license and the associated fee. First of all, and as for the previous 
model, the choice of an open license source supports co-operation of a community of 
programmers and diffusion, which can be interesting in a context of battle of standards. 
Then, the coupled choice of a proprietary and not free license for the commercial users also 
gives the possibility to the software publisher to capture value, while enabling him to 
generate incomes thanks to the direct use of its IPR on its software. The advantage of this 
model lies in the fact that it makes impossible the capture of value by a third. Here, the 
software publisher is the only agent likely to recover the benefit of the direct valorisation of 
his product, since it is made through the license, that he is the only one being able to 
concede.  
However, this business model is not applicable in all circumstance and remains held 
rather with software publishers producing components than end use products. A 
“component” is a product made up of rather low layers, not intended to be used just as it is, 
but to be integrated into end use software. A component is thus a kind of tool used by other 
software publishers to develop their own sometimes commercial products. An end product is 
usually made up of low and high layers which make it an application software directly usable 
by a user. It does not have vocation, like components, with being integrated by software 
publishers in solutions intended to be sold. For a component, the model of direct valorisation 
on two discriminated markets is applicable, because if the product is powerful and meets a 
certain notoriety, software publishers will subscribe the proprietary license needed to use it in 
their commercial software. In the case of finished products, this model is not applicable 
because the market is only composed of users who do not have vocation to create derived 
proprietary products; this prohibits any discrimination of the conditions of use and any 
possibility of value capture through a proprietary license.  
The model of mutualisation 
The Open Source has many advantages for users, such as a good fit to their needs, a 
continual enrichment, an absence of lock-in and a provision to the community of resources 
created in a collaborative way. However, some large companies are aware of such 
advantages and some already use open source software such as the Linux operating system 
or the Apache server. Nevertheless, being given the nature of the projects mobilizing the 
community of developers, which are focused on rather generic needs, the open source offer 
of specific application software reserved to a limited number of large accounts need remains 
rare. This can be explained by the fact that the only available business models do not fit well. 
: 
- the business models of bundle are all the more risky for the software publisher that 
the difficult mobilization of a community obliges him to support almost all the development 
costs, for a random value capture; when the software is very innovative and requires large 
investments, these models are not easy to use. For example, IdealX, a company developing 
dematerialization, identity management and secure infrastructure solutions quickly had to 
give up its business model based on the supply of integration services of their open source 
software. 
- The models of double license, on the other hand, remain reserved for software 
belonging to the category of components, and not of end use software. 
The principle of mutualisation thus emerges from this double lack: on one hand a lack 
of open source end use software for big customers (taking into account the difficulty of 
creating around them communities of development), and on the other hand no possibilities 
for software publishers to benefit from a secure source of value capture. IdealX thus 
developed a business model which precisely solves this double lack. It creates an economic 
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community for big customers within which they can share the development costs: it is the 
principle of mutualisation. In addition, IdealX is committed to not publishing the software 
outside this community during a certain time, so that the members of this community profit 
from a competitive advantage thanks to the use of the software. This can be compared to 
secrecy, a known mean of protection. Indeed, although the software is open source, people 
are free to use it, copy it and diffuse it when they get it. Thus, if the members of a community 
do not want to diffuse it in order to keep a competitive advantage, the source code is held 
secret and shared, during a certain time at least, only by the members of the community 
taking part financially in its development.  
From the software publisher’s point of view, a source of value capture is created, 
thanks to the fact that customers do not have the means of developing themselves the open 
source software they need, but rather financial means to pay a company to do it. The 
business model created by IdealX ensues from the absence of a community of development 
and the will of the community of customers to secure against any free-rider behaviour, while 
retaining temporarily the diffusion of the open source software within their community. This 
practice is related to secrecy and it precisely makes it possible for IdealX to mitigate the 
effects of a regime of non-appropriability, to be protected against imitation and to guarantee 
a value capture through the remuneration of its development activity.  
Conclusion 
This article enabled us to highlight the difference between open strategies and open 
source strategies. Certainly, the strategic advantages of these two types of strategy lie in the 
diffusion of software and the possible co-operation with a community, that are both 
favourable to the software to reach a statute of standard.  
However, the open strategies given a choice of license supporting diffusion and co-
operation, imply the set up of a weak regime of appropriability, but allow the software 
publisher to keep the share of control necessary to benefit from a competitive advantage and 
to capture value. In this manner, the license is a strategic tool which will be modulated 
according to the degree of control that the sponsor wants to keep.  
In the case of open source strategies, the license is not such a powerful strategic tool 
anymore insofar as the room for manoeuvre of the software publisher on the choice of the 
clauses of the license is limited by the criteria imposed by the OSI. Besides, these criteria are 
established in order to preserve the open character of the software and to limit the 
possibilities of control and appropriation by the software publisher. The set up regime is thus 
a regime of non-appropriability and it is difficult for the open source software publishers to 
find viable business models; yet securing value capture is essential to their survival in the 
commercial sphere. 
Finally, just as free licenses that set up regimes of non-appropriability constitute 
institutions having emerged in order to prevent the appropriation of software developed in a 
collaborative way, open source business models emerge from the will of commercial firms, 
according to the open source philosophy to create a profitable commercial activity while 
respecting the open source principles, i.e. its regime of non-appropriability. Initially models of 
bundle appeared followed by models of double license and others like mutualisation. Now 
they appear through the trial and errors of companies such as IdealX, because they are 
better adapted to various types of products and customers. However, for software with strong 
intensity of innovation, one moves away from open source business models using the 
characteristics of the licenses to explore more dynamic open source business models based 
on the management of communities and of the life cycle of products. Thus, whereas the 
methodology of strategic analysis of licenses we proposed is successfully applicable to 
cases of companies using hybrid non open source licenses, it is much less usable for cases 
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of open source software publishers. Indeed, in the first case, the handling of the clauses of 
the licenses makes it possible to achieve goals in terms of co-operation, diffusion and 
valorisation, whereas in the second one, the handling of the clauses offers limited 
possibilities if one wants to respect the open source criteria; the businesses models allowing 
the reconciliation of these three strategic components do not appear through the clauses of 
the license because they are dynamic and play on other elements than licences. 
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i We borrowed the expression “the best of the two worlds”, from GABRIEL and JOY [1998], 
because it perfectly mirrors Sun Microsystems’ will to draw advantage from both strategies of opening 
and control, in its interest. It should however be specified that the document from which this 
expression is drawn is reproduced on the site of Sun Microsystems (that is why it can appear partial), 
and that its authors understand by the expression “the best of the two worlds”, the best of the two 
worlds in the interest of the users, thanks to the virtues drawn from the co-operation, especially in 
terms of quality, and thanks to those drawn, according to the authors of the proprietary character of 
the license, i.e. a protection of the intellectual property right, an organization allowing the to structure 
co-operative innovation and a clearer control of compatibility (these arguments are arguable and 
largely called into question by the open source community, but we will not discuss them). They do not 
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mention of course the share of control that the non open source clauses confer to Sun, which could be 
used against the users, especially by locking them in. 
ii Besides one sees today that the success of Linux rests on its integration with the commercial 
sphere and the construction of a whole economic fabric around it, without whom it could not have 
reached his current statute. One can in particular quote IBM, which has decided very early to integrate 
Linux solutions into his commercial offer, but also the software engineering and maintenance 
companies, who today offer services around Linux, whereas this type of service was formerly reserved 
for firms devoted to open source software. 
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